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DEVILS IN THE DETAILS: AN ESSAY EXAMINING THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF JURISDICTIONAL DEFAULT RULES IN 
THE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS CONTEXT 
Choice of law is one of those concepts that law school professors love to 
focus on in different courses. However, the concept raises the question: does 
choice of law make a practical difference? The short answer is no. Generally 
speaking, laws between U.S. states rarely diverge to the degree that would 
prompt individuals to sue exclusively in state X over state Y. Differences in 
laws between U.S. states carry de minimis value and only become a heightened 
concern on a specific case by case basis. There are exceptions to this general 
rule. In the realm of mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”), U.S. state laws and 
court opinions addressing “sandbagging,”1 waiver of jury trial, and non-
compete provisions are several of these exceptions. For example, it is 
universally agreed in the M&A world that Delaware, New York, and 
California are, respectively, “pro-sandbagging,” neutral/ambiguous toward 
sandbagging, and “anti-sandbagging.” But why are there differences and why 
do they matter? This Essay attempts to answer these questions as well as 
provide an analysis of the three aforementioned provisions found in M&A 
agreements nationwide. 
First, this Essay will outline its scope and goals accompanied by a brief 
foundation of mergers and acquisitions. Second, it will demonstrate the effect 
of a jurisdiction’s default rule in an M&A deal followed by a detailed 
discussion of each M&A provision—sandbagging, waiver of jury trial, and 
non-compete—and various jurisdictional default responses. Third, it will put 
forward alternative theories and reasons why Delaware, New York, and 
California approach sandbagging, waiver of jury trial, and non-compete 
provisions in their respective ways. 
INTRODUCTION 
Before this Essay continues with its analysis of the above-mentioned M&A 
provisions and varying jurisdictional treatment of those provisions, a brief 
foundation of M&A is needed. The terms mergers and acquisitions are often 
 
 1 Generally, the term “sandbagging” refers to the contract provision that addresses the impact and result 
of one party’s pre-closing knowledge of a breach of another’s warranty in an agreement. Aleksandra Miziolek 
& Dimitrios Angelakos, From Poker to the World of Mergers and Acquisitions, MICH. B. J. 30, 30–31 (2013). 
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used interchangeably; however, the two terms are fundamentally different. 
Without getting into an advanced discussion, an acquisition refers to one 
business entity buying another either in its entirety or in part.2 On the other 
hand, a merger refers to two separate business entities combining together to 
form a completely new business entity.3 Therefore, although the two terms are 
used interchangeably, it is important to know they refer to two different 
situations and should not be used synonymously.4 
Broadly defined, mergers and acquisitions are one of many corporate tools 
at the disposal of corporate officers, boards of directors, and shareholders5 in 
stimulating growth for their organizations. While 2016 has been characterized 
as a “bumpy year”6 for M&A activity, a recent survey conducted by a “Big 
Four” accounting firm, Deloitte, LLP, asked 1,000 corporate and private equity 
investors to weigh in on what they thought 2017 would hold for M&A 
activity.7 The survey’s results indicated that roughly 75% of the investors 
believe M&A activity will increase in 2017 and, more importantly, 64% of the 
respondents believe respective deal sizes will increase as well. Given the 
expected increase in M&A activity, this is an opportune time to study M&A 
transactions and how they may vary from state to state. 
This Essay’s scope is primarily centered on the case study of the three 
M&A provisions—sandbagging, waiver of jury trial, and non-compete—and 
their respective treatment in Delaware, New York, and California. These three 
common provisions found in M&A agreements were chosen for examination 
because they highlight various jurisdictions’ divergent approaches. The 
jurisdictions of Delaware, New York, and California were chosen because each 
state is highly representative of its respective category of jurisdiction. 
Moreover, these three states see their fair share of M&A deals.8 This Essay 
 
 2 Mergers And Acquisitions-M&A, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/ 
mergersandacquisitions.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
 3 Id.  
 4 It is also important to note that there are other subgroups of mergers and acquisitions, but this 
discussion is outside the scope of this Essay. Additionally, this Essay will not weigh the benefits and costs of 
choosing whether to merge or to acquire. 
 5 Often majority of shareholders entitled to vote need to approve a merger or acquisition action before 
the corporate entity can proceed with the action. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (Lexis Advance through 81 Del. 
Laws, ch. 2). 
 6 Russell Thomson et al., M&A trends report 2016, year-end edition, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte. 
com/us/en/pages/mergers-and-acquisitions/articles/ma-trends-report.html (last visited Mar. 2017). 
 7 Id. 
 8 In 2011, Delaware alone had roughly more than half of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 60% of 
Fortune 500 companies incorporated in its jurisdiction. Doug Bend, The Top 10 Reasons to Incorporate in 
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does not close the door on mentioning other states’ treatment where relevant 
and by no means does it intend to provide a state by state legal survey of each 
state’s approach towards various M&A provisions. This Essay has two simple 
goals. First, to highlight the importance of considering how a specific 
jurisdiction’s approach may affect a M&A transaction and negotiation. Second, 
to answer why Delaware, New York, and California have taken their respective 
stances. In working towards these goals, this Essay will also answer why a 
choice of law decision exists to begin with and why there is competition 
among the states in the M&A realm. 
I. SANDBAGGING, WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL, AND NON-COMPETE—WHY DO 
THE DIFFERENCES MATTER? 
To illustrate the importance of these three provisions and their respective 
treatment, what follows is a hypothetical demonstrating the effect of 
sandbagging. Imagine in the eleventh hour of a several yearlong negotiated 
asset purchase agreement to acquire assets from Business S that Business B 
finds an inaccuracy during their due diligence of Business S’s corporate 
records. At this point, Business B must decide whether to disclose the 
inaccuracy to Business S, which may further prolong the negotiations and the 
overall timetable of the already lengthy deal, or to continue to closing and not 
inform Business S of the inaccuracy. For obvious reasons, the former is 
undesirable to Business B, especially given the facts. However, the aftermath 
of the latter raises a couple of questions. While inaccuracies in corporate 
records do not always cause noteworthy issues, it may turn out that the 
inaccuracy causes a significant misrepresentation or breach of warranty by 
Business S in the asset purchase agreement. Should Business S be liable to 
Business B for damages sustained from the misrepresentation or breach? 
Should Business S be liable to Business B if Business B knew about the 
misrepresentation or breach ahead of time and chose not to disclose it to 
Business S, who might have been able to remedy it before the closing of the 
deal? 
Although this illustration may appear trivial on its face, the answers to the 
questions above determine whether years of hard work along with millions of 
dollars go to waste. For example, Jurisdiction X may rule in favor of Business 
S and force Business B to bear the costs. At the same time, Jurisdiction Y may 
 
Delware, BEND L. GROUP, PROF. CORP. (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.bendlawoffice.com/2011/08/01/reasons-to-
incorporate-in-delaware/. 
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rule in favor of Business B and force Business S to remedy Business B’s 
losses. A real-world example follows demonstrating the monetary impact a 
default rule may have. In Cobalt Operating, LLC v. James Crystal Enterprises, 
LLC,9 Delaware’s pro-sandbagging default rule allowed the buyer in an asset 
purchase agreement to recover at least $12 million from the $70 million 
purchase price.10 Thus, it is prudent for any business entity and its board of 
directors contemplating a M&A transaction to be privy to the way its 
jurisdiction(s) treats certain M&A provisions, especially those entities that 
have footholds in several different jurisdictions. What follows is a breakdown 
of the three M&A provisions along with how Delaware, New York, and 
California treat each one and why. 
A. Sandbagging 
The term “sandbagging” has been said to be associated with the poker 
strategy of refraining from raising at first in hopes of being able to raise more 
steeply later.11 Sandbagging occurs in a deal when a party, almost always the 
buyer, seeks to recover, usually through an indemnification provision, for a 
misrepresentation or breach of warranty for an inaccuracy that the party had 
knowledge of prior to the closing.12 While parties may contract around the 
action of sandbagging via either pro-sandbagging or anti-sandbagging 
provisions, it is crucial, especially in high dollar-figure deals, to know what 
relevant default rules govern a particular jurisdiction are. 
In determining whether a jurisdiction is pro-sandbagging or anti-
sandbagging, the crux is whether the jurisdiction views the breach of warranty 
claim as a tort claim or a breach of contract claim.13 This distinction is 
important because, in a tort claim, reliance is a necessary element.14 If a party 
knew of the breach of warranty beforehand, it could not argue reliance on the 
warranty to its detriment.15 This would be an example of an anti-sandbagging 
jurisdiction. However, if the jurisdiction views the breach of warranty claim as 
 
 9 No. 714-VCS, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108 (Ch. July 20, 2007). 
 10 Id. at *2, *10; David K. Cho & Seon N. Chung, Sandbagging in M&A Transactions: Default Rules in 
Delaware, New York and California, ONPOINT (Oct. 2016), https://info.dechert.com/10/7362/october-
2016/sandbagging-in-manda-transactions—default-rules-in-delaware—new-york-and-california-(final)(1).asp? 
sid=d5f32a7d-6120-481f-a818-ec1badcaf96c. 
 11 Miziolek, supra note 1, at 30. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 32. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
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a claim for breach of contract, then a party’s pre-closing knowledge is 
irrelevant because reliance on the truth of the warranty is not a requirement for 
recovery.16 This would be an example of a pro-sandbagging jurisdiction. 
Originally, Delaware was considered an anti-sandbagging jurisdiction.17 
However, in 2005 the Delaware Superior Court held in Interim Healthcare, 
Inc. v. Spherion Corp., that reliance was not a requirement for a breach of 
warranty claim and, more importantly, that the purchaser in the case had the 
right to rely on the seller’s warranties.18 Subsequently, the Supreme Court of 
Delaware in James Crystal Enterprises, LLC v. Cobalt Operating, LLC 
affirmed this latter view and rejected the tort approach when it was presented 
with James Crystal Enterprises’ appeal, which was the real-world example 
stated earlier.19 These decisions solidify Delaware, at least for now, as a pro-
sandbagging jurisdiction. 
As mentioned earlier, New York is a bit more complex in its approach 
towards sandbagging than Delaware. In CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Pub. Co., the 
New York Court of Appeals diverged from past court opinions by holding that 
the breach of contract ideology applied to breaches of warranties and that 
reliance was still a necessary element of a breach of warranty.20 However, the 
court also held that reliance could be found if a party relied on the “express 
warranty as being a part of the bargain between the parties”21 rather than if the 
party relied on the truth of the warranty itself.22 The court found reliance 
because the buyer believed it was purchasing the seller’s promise that the 
warranties made were true. The Second Circuit later clarified the CBS Inc. 
opinion via its holding in Galli v. Metz.23 In Galli, the Second Circuit returned 
to a more tort-esque approach by disallowing the party that knew of the breach 
 
 16 Miziolek, supra note 1, at 32. 
 17 Id.; Kelly v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., C.A. No. 99C-09-265 WCC, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 39 (Super. 
Ct. Jan. 17, 2002). 
 18 884 A.2d 513, 548 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005) (stating that “[t]o the extent Spherion [the seller] warranted a 
fact or circumstance to be true in the Agreement, plaintiffs were entitled to rely upon the accuracy of the 
representation irregardless [sic] of what their due diligence may have or should have revealed. In this regard, 
Spherion accepted the risk of loss to the full extent of its indemnification commitments in the event its 
covenants were breached.”); see Charles K. Whitehead, Sandbagging: Default Rules and Acquisition 
Agreements, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1081, 1109 (2011). 
 19 No. 491, 2007, 2008 Del. LEXIS 117 (Del. Mar. 11, 2008). 
 20 75 N.Y.2d 496, 503 (1990). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Miziolek, supra note 1, at 33. 
 23 973 F.2d 145, 150–51 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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prior to closing to bring a breach claim post-closing.24 To reconcile the 
differences between these two cases, the Second Circuit in Rogath v. 
Siebenmann25 and the Southern District of New York in Gusmao v. GMT 
Group, Inc.26 found a middle ground by requiring a close examination of “the 
extent and source of the buyer’s knowledge.”27 This means that if the seller is 
the source of the information that notifies the buyer of a breach before closing 
between the seller and the buyer, then New York courts view the buyer as 
having waived his/her right to recovery from that breach post-closing. 
However, if the seller is not the source of the information that notifies the 
buyer of the breach, then New York courts view the seller’s warranty or 
representation as part of the bargain between the parties and allows the buyer 
to recover, because New York courts do not view receiving information about 
a breach from a third-party pre-closing as a waiver.28 Thus, New York can be 
best described as a neutral/ambiguous toward sandbagging jurisdiction given 
its special nuanced approach. 
California, on the other hand, requires buyer’s reliance to make a breach of 
warranty claim.29 California courts have long held and affirmed this rule.30 
Despite the Grinnell and Kazerouni cases and a strong history supporting anti-
sandbagging provisions, one Northern District of California decision held that 
California does not require a buyer to show reliance if a pro-sandbagging 
provision is drafted into the M&A deal that expressly states the buyer’s 
knowledge does not affect buyer’s reliance.31 This means that if the parties in a 
M&A deal agree that the buyer’s knowledge will not adversely affect his or her 
 
 24 Id. at 151 (stating that “[w]here a buyer closes on a contract in the full knowledge and acceptance of 
facts disclosed by the seller which would constitute a breach of warranty under the terms of the contract, the 
buyer should be foreclosed from later asserting the breach. In that situation, unless the buyer expressly 
preserves his rights under the warranties (as CBS did in Ziff-Davis), we think the buyer has waived the 
breach.”); Miziolek, supra note 1, at 33. 
 25 129 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 26 No. 06 Civ. 5113(GEL), 2008 WL 2980039 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008). 
 27 Rogath, 129 F.3d at 264; Miziolek, supra note 1, at 33–34. 
 28 See Rogath, 129 F.3d at 264 (citing Galli 973 F.2d at 151). 
 29 Cho, supra note 11. 
 30 See Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal.App.2d 424, 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); see also 
Kazerouni v. De Satnick, 228 Cal.App.3d 871, 873–74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
 31 Telephia, Inc. v. Cuppy, 411 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (stating that “Telephia argues 
that it need not prove reliance because of the terms of the SPA. In § 6.1, the SPA states that ‘[n]o information 
or knowledge obtained in any investigation pursuant to this Section 6.1 shall affect or be deemed to modify 
any representation or warranty contained in this AgreementFalse’ . . . In addition, § 10.1 of the SPA provides, 
‘No investigation made by or on behalf of the Company [Telephia] with respect to Criterion or the 
Securityholders shall be deemed to affect the Company Affiliates’ . . . reliance on the representations, 
warranties, covenants, and agreements made by Criterion.’”). 
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ability to seek indemnification because of a misrepresentation or breach of 
warranty of the seller, then the courts applying California law will honor the 
parties’ agreement. Thus, except in the unique circumstance described above, 
California has solidified itself as an anti-sandbagging jurisdiction. 
B. Waiver of Jury Trial 
Waiver of jury trial provisions are present in almost all transactional 
agreements, not just in M&A deals. However, for the purposes of this Essay 
only pre-litigation jury trial waivers will be addressed due to this Essay’s 
M&A scope. Technically speaking, the right to a jury trial for civil litigants in 
federal court is a right protected by the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.32 Thus, one could reasonably believe that waiver of jury trial 
provisions are constitutional issues. However, the Seventh Amendment does 
not apply to the states.33 States are thus allowed to decide whether parties to an 
agreement can contract away their rights to a jury trial. Although most states 
allow parties to waive their rights to a jury trial, two states have vehemently 
opposed such provisions.34 California and Georgia courts have held that pre-
litigation waiver of jury trial provisions are unenforceable.35 
For Georgia, the seminal case disapproving of jury trial waivers is Bank 
South, N.A. v. Howard, which dates back to 1994.36 The underlining case 
involved a guaranty dispute.37 However, the guaranty contained a waiver of 
jury trial provision and the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari on that 
issue alone.38 The court justified its holding against the waiver by citing to the 
Constitution of Georgia and the Civil Practice Act,39 both of which state that 
the right to a jury trial is a constitutional right.40 The court also interpreted the 
 
 32 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 33 Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 219 (1916) (stating that “But this affords no 
ground for the proposition that the [Seventh] Amendment is applicable and controlling in proceedings in state 
courts deriving their authority from state law, in the teeth of the express and settled doctrine that the 
Amendment does not relate to proceedings in such courts.”); Nicole S. Magaline, 2 Unique Takes On Jury 
Waiver Clauses, LAW360 (Mar. 3, 2011, 5:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/229586/2-unique-takes-
on-jury-waiver-clauses?article_related_content=1. 
 34 Magaline, supra note 34. 
 35 See Bank South, N.A. v. Howard, 264 Ga. 339 (1994); see Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court, 36 
Cal. 4th 944 (2005). 
 36 See Bank South, 264 Ga. at 340–41. 
 37 Id. at 339. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-39(a).  
 40 Bank South, 264 Ga. at 340. 
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fact that both the Constitution of Georgia and the Georgia Civil Practice Act 
only mention jury trial waivers in the context of the beginning stages of 
litigation as evidence that pre-litigation waiver of jury trial provisions are 
unenforceable.41 The court seemed to anchor its view on the premise that since 
the right to a jury trial was considered a constitutional right, pre-litigation jury 
trial waivers are subject to heightened scrutiny and fail to pass muster.42 Thus, 
a court applying Georgia law will not enforce a pre-litigation jury trial waiver 
provision. 
More recently, the California Supreme Court joined Georgia on this issue 
in 2005 via its holding in Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court.43 The 
underlining dispute in Grafton Partners primarily centered on a breach of 
contract claim between Grafton Partners and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 
its then auditor.44 The engagement letter between Grafton Partners and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers contained a pre-litigation waiver of jury trial 
provision, which became the main issue on appeal after the trial court granted 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ motion to strike Grafton Partners’ demand for a jury 
trial.45 The California Supreme Court approached the issue in the same fashion 
as the Georgia Supreme Court.46 Both courts turned to their respective state 
constitutions and jury waiver statutes.47 Since California’s constitution states 
that the right to a jury trial is one protected by the state and California’s jury 
waiver statute48 only makes reference to waivers of juries once litigation has 
commenced, the California Supreme Court reversed PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ 
motion to strike and held pre-litigation jury trial waivers provisions 
unenforceable.49 Consequently, a court applying California law will not allow 
a party to a contract or agreement to waive its right to a jury trial before 
litigation has commenced.50 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit recently via its in 
 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. (stating that “[g]iven the similarity of waivers of jury trial and confessions of judgment, and 
considering the magnitude of the rights involved and the probability of abuse that exists in both situations, 
waivers of jury trial are sufficiently analogous to confessions of judgment that the same rule should apply.”). 
 43 See Grafton Partners, 36 Cal. 4th at 967. 
 44 Id. at 950; Magaline, supra note 34. 
 45 Grafton Partners, 36 Cal. 4th at 951. 
 46 Magaline, supra note 34. 
 47 Id.; Grafton Partners, 36 Cal. 4th at 951. 
 48 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 631 (Deering, Lexis Advance through all 2016 legislation and propositions 
(2016 Regular and 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sessions)); Magaline, supra note 34. 
 49 Grafton Partners, 36 Cal. 4th at 967. 
 50 It is important to note that while pre-litigation jury trial waivers are unenforceable in California, pre-
litigation jury trial waivers in the context of arbitration agreements are specifically enforceable under 
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281. Id. at 952, 955.  
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re County of Orange ruling held that if a waiver of jury trial dispute arises 
from actions in California to a federal court, then that federal court must apply 
California law.51 The Ninth Circuit resolved the discrepancy of treatment 
between California law and federal law, which allows waivers as long as the 
waivers meet the “knowing and voluntary” standard, by stating that the federal 
standard is a constitutional minimum.52 Thus, any state law that protects 
litigants’ Seventh Amendment rights to a higher degree than federal law will 
supersede the federal law in federal court.53 
C. Non-Compete 
Similar to waiver of jury trial provisions, non-compete provisions are a 
metaphoric can of worms. A non-compete provision in a contract or agreement 
refers to a restrictive covenant on the part of one party to not compete with 
another party in some stated capacity either post-closing or post-termination of 
the agreement.54 The treatment of these provisions vary widely from state-to-
state.55 Moreover, the study of non-compete provisions contains various facets 
and is multidimensional in nature.56 Thus, the following provides a brief 
analysis that focuses on Delaware’s, New York’s, and California’s 
enforcement of non-compete provisions. 
Delaware and New York follow the approach that, as long as a non-
compete provision is reasonable, it is enforceable.57 Both states have 
repeatedly affirmed this view.58 Although their tests for reasonableness may 
 
 51 784 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 52 County of Orange, 784 F.3d at 531. 
 53 Id. at 531–32. 
 54 Viva R. Moffat, Article, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 939, 940–42 (2012). 
 55 Id. at 943. 
 56 Within the category of states that enforce reasonable non-compete provisions, there are subcategories 
that differ on the appropriate treatment of modification when they are presented with a non-compete provision 
that is overbroad or overbearing. Id. at 948–49. For example, there is one subsect that follows the “blue pencil” 
doctrine, which allows the jurisdiction to re-draft an unreasonable non-compete provision to bring it within the 
spectrum of reasonableness. Id. Conversely, there are other jurisdictions that do not re-draft non-compete 
provisions and, thus, when presented with an unreasonable non-compete provision, they will not enforce it. Id.  
 57 Ascension Insurance Holdings, LLC v. Underwood, No. 9897-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19 (Ch. 
Jan. 28, 2015); Moffat, supra note 55, at 948. 
 58 See generally Moffat, supra note 55; see also Ascension Insurance Holdings, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
19; see also Nicholas J. Boyle & Richard A. Olderman, Restrictive Covenants: The Law In Flux, LAW360 
(Feb. 4, 2016, 11:27 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/754308/restrictive-covenants-the-law-in-flux; see 
also Summary of Covenants Not To Compete: A Global Perspective, FENWICK & WEST LLP (2009), 
https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/RS_Summary-of-Covenants.pdf. 
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differ slightly,59 the two jurisdictions ascribe to the ideology that parties have 
the right of freedom of contract.60 This allows parties to an agreement to 
contract and be bound by restrictive covenants. As recent as 2015, the Court of 
Chancery of Delaware in Ascension Insurance Holdings, LLC v. Underwood 
stated, “The ability to self-order is the sine qua non of free markets; without 
the ability to hold and dispose of property, and to agree to be bound 
contractually, no functional market could exist.”61 
On the other hand, California along with a handful of other states fervently 
oppose the enforceability of non-compete provisions.62 Section 16600 of 
California’s Business & Professions Code states, “every contract by which 
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of 
any kind is to that extent void.”63 In Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, the 
California Supreme Court stated that, “[Section 16600] protects Californians 
and ensures ‘that every citizen shall retain the right to pursue any lawful 
employment and enterprise of their choice.’”64 In essence, California believes 
the “right to work” outweighs the right of freedom of contract in the context of 
non-compete provisions. The Edwards decision is also noteworthy because 
Arthur Andersen argued for the court to adopt a narrow-restraint exception, but 
the court ended up rejecting the proposition outright and re-affirmed 
California’s strong stance of non-compete unenforceability.65 However, 
California does have a small carve out for M&A transactions. Section 16601 of 
California’s Business & Professions Code states, “Any person who sells the 
goodwill of a business, or any owner of a business entity selling or otherwise 
disposing of all of his or her ownership interest in the business entity . . . may 
 
 59 Compare Ascension Insurance Holdings, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19 at *6–7 (stating that “[u]nder 
Delaware law, “[t]o be enforceable, a covenant not to compete must (1) meet general contract law 
requirements, (2) be reasonable in scope and duration, both geographically and temporally, (3) advance a 
legitimate economic interest of the party enforcing the covenant, and (4) survive a balance of the equities.”“), 
with BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 388–89 (N.Y. 1999) (stating that “[a] restraint is reasonable 
only if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) 
does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public.”); see Natural 
Organics, Inc. v. Kirkendall, 52 A.D.3d 488, 489 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (stating that “[a] non-compete 
agreement must also be reasonably limited temporally and geographically.”). 
 60 Ascension Insurance Holdings, 2015 Del. Ch. 19 at *6. 
 61 Id. at *19. 
 62 Moffat, supra note 55, at 944. 
 63 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (Deering, Lexis Advance through all 2016 legislation and propositions 
(2016 Regular and 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sessions)). 
 64 44 Cal. 4th 937, 946 (2008) (quoting Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 22 
Cal.App.4th 853, 859 (1994)). 
 65 Edwards, 44 Cal. 4th at 950. 
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agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a 
specified geographic area in which the business so sold.”66 The California 
Court of Appeal in Strategix, Ltd. v. Infocrossing West, Inc., explained that 
Section 16601 protects the value of the asset sold, because without Section 
16601 the seller would be able to compete with the buyer and reduce the value 
of property right that buyer had just bought.67 Thus, California generally 
speaking does not enforce non-compete provisions. 
II. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES TO TREATMENT DISCREPANCY 
Having illustrated how Delaware, New York, and California treat 
sandbagging, waiver of jury trial, and non-compete provisions in the context of 
M&A deals, this Essay now shifts to examine and advance several alternative 
theories as to why Delaware, New York, and California have such a 
divergence of approaches. These theories include a state’s dependence on 
franchise taxes, the importance of a state’s market size, and the influence of 
state specific interest groups. 
A. Delaware 
Delaware’s particular treatment of the three aforementioned M&A 
provisions can be better understood by acknowledging its dependence on 
corporate fees and franchise taxes. As Professor William Cary details, shortly 
before Delaware became home to more than half of Fortune 500 companies, it 
largely lived in the shadow of New Jersey.68 Around the 1890s, New Jersey 
was modern-day Delaware due to its liberal corporate laws, and benefited 
greatly.69 During this time, New Jersey was collecting huge sums of money 
from corporate filing fees and franchise taxes as a result of its liberal corporate 
laws that by 1902 “it was able to abolish all property taxes and still pay off its 
entire state debt.”70 However, after Governor Woodrow Wilson in 1913 
enacted the “Seven Sisters Laws,”71 corporations began to re-incorporate in 
 
 66 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16601 (Deering, Lexis Advance through all 2016 legislation and propositions 
(2016 Regular and 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sessions)). 
 67 142 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1072–73 (2006). 
 68 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 664 
(1974). 
 69 Id. at 664. 
 70 Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL .J. CORP. L. 
249, 268 (1976). 
 71 Id. at 270 (These seven detailed provisions generally outlawed the trust and the holding company as 
well as restricted corporate authority.). 
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Delaware.72 Delaware’s primary goal for copying New Jersey’s then corporate 
code was to obtain a new source of revenue for the state and that it did.73 
Franchise taxes alone made up roughly 16% of Delaware’s 2015 state 
budget,74 but others have argued that income from corporate fees and franchise 
taxes to be closer to one-quarter of Delaware’s state budget.75 Thus, it is 
reasonable to conclude that some of the legislature’s and judiciary’s actions are 
motivated with the state budget in mind. This is supported by the fact that 
Delaware has a population of only 952,065 and is one of the smallest states.76 
With a relatively small population and small land mass, Delaware is limited in 
sources of revenue. 
Another alternative theory for Delaware’s treatment of the three M&A 
provisions is the “revolving door” movement of interested parties. In 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, Professor Cary 
proved using hard data that Chief Justices of the Delaware Supreme Court 
throughout their careers were switching between roles as judges, legislators, 
and corporate attorneys.77 He hinted to the development of an unhealthy 
relationship between the private corporate sector and the Delaware state 
government.78 Although this was not occurring all at the same time and by 
everyone, it is still demonstrates that certain judges and representatives held 
some bias in favor of corporations, especially if they intended to have a career 
off the bench. 
These two theories help explain why Delaware is pro-sandbagging, permits 
waiver of jury trial, and permits reasonable non-compete provisions. Delaware 
is beholden to its Fortune 500 residents and the benefits that relationship 
produces. In an effort to retain those benefits, Delaware, through its legislature 
and judiciary promulgated laws and case decisions that favor corporations, 
especially large corporations. In the M&A context, these corporations would 
be the typical buyers in a deal and, thus, Delaware’s treatment of the three 
M&A provisions is clearly pro-buyer. 
 
 72 Cary, supra note 69, at 664. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Governor’s Budget Financial Summary and Charts, STATE OF DELAWARE (2017), http://budget. 
delaware.gov/budget/fy2017/documents/operating/vol1/financial-summary.pdf. 
 75 Cary, supra note 69, at 697–98. 
 76 QuickFacts: Delaware, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/ 
PST045216/10 (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
 77 Cary, supra note 69, at 690–92. 
 78 Id. 
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B. New York 
Contrary to Delaware, New York holds greater leeway in drafting its laws 
and case decisions because it has a larger population, it is less reliant on 
franchise taxes, and has a bigger market size. New York has a population of 
around 19,745,289 and a land area of 47,126.40 square miles.79 In addition, the 
New York state budget is far less reliant on franchise taxes and corporate fees 
for revenue.80 With around 536,890 employer establishments in New York 
compared to Delaware’s 24,312, corporations and other business entities have 
less bargaining power to reject New York law-via threatening to exit the state-
than in Delaware.81 This is especially true given that corporations by their very 
nature desire to grow and increase their profit margins. For these reasons, New 
York is less beholden to corporations than Delaware and this is demonstrated 
in New York’s treatment of the three aforesaid M&A provisions. 
As discussed in Part II, New York has a nuanced approach toward 
sandbagging, permits waiver of jury trial, and permits reasonable non-compete 
provisions. Although New York and Delaware have real-world differences and 
their respective approaches on sandbagging differ slightly, they generally 
appear to approach the three M&A provisions in a similar manner. A possible 
explanation for this consistency could be the housing and influence of Wall 
Street along with some of the U.S.’s major financial institutions. Thus, New 
York’s treatment of the three M&A provisions suggests that it is also a pro-
buyer jurisdiction. 
C. California 
With scarcely any of its budget stemming from franchise taxes and a large 
market size, California is barely in a position to be influenced by pro-buyer or 
pro-large corporation forces and of the three case studies carries the greatest 
amount of independence. California has a population of roughly 39,250,017 
and a land area of 155,779.22 square miles.82 Its projected budget for 2017-
2018 estimates around 90.6% of its revenue to be generated from personal 
 
 79 QuickFacts: New York, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/ 
PST045216/36 (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
 80 Government Revenue Details, USGOVERNMENTREVENUE.COM, http://www.usgovernmentrevenue.com/ 
year_revenue_2017NYbs_18bs1n_40305060#usgs302 (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
 81 QuickFacts: New York, supra note 80. 
 82 QuickFacts: California, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/ 
PST045216/06 (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
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income taxes, sales taxes, use taxes, and insurance taxes.83 If the rest of 
California’s sources of revenue were combined, those sources would only 
make up roughly 9.4% of the budget.84 These other sources would include not 
only franchise taxes, but also corporate taxes as well as other taxes and fees.85 
In addition, California has roughly 889,646 employer establishments, 
which is almost double that of New York.86 With population, land area, and 
employer establishments in mind, California holds by far the largest market 
size of three and arguably nationwide. As stated previously, a large market size 
affords a jurisdiction greater bargaining power with corporations, especially 
when the jurisdiction practically encompasses the entire West Coast of the U.S. 
For these reasons, California’s ability to withstand pro-buyer influence is 
accurately reflected in the jurisdiction’s treatment of the three aforementioned 
M&A provisions. In many ways, California is a pro-seller or pro-worker 
jurisdiction. California’s default rules prohibit sandbagging, waiver of jury 
trial, and generally non-compete provisions, except for the narrow M&A 
exemption for non-compete provisions.87 The presence and dominance of 
Silicon Valley may help explain a couple of these approaches. For example, 
many high-tech firms that call California home benefit tremendously from the 
free flow of ideas and human capital. This is supported by the fact that the 
human capital for these high-tech firms is finite and, thus, not easily 
replaceable due to the highly technical nature of their businesses and 
specialized knowledge and skill requirements.88 Additionally, the presence of 
thousands of tech startups also helps rationalize why California leans more 
towards a seller favorable jurisdiction.89 
 
 83 Governor’s Budget Summary–2017-18, STATE OF CALIFORNIA (2017), http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/ 
2017-18/pdf/BudgetSummary/SummaryCharts.pdf. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 QuickFacts: California, supra note 83. 
 87 See Part II, supra. 
 88 See Tracey Lien, Changes to H-1B visa policy could have a chilling effect on the tech industry, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Apr. 4, 2017, 6:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-silicon-valley-
h1b-changes-20170404-story.html. 
 89 See Kriston Capps, Tech startups will never leave Silicon Valley — here’s why, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Dec. 26, 2015, 4:22 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/tech-startups-will-never-leave-silicon-valley-heres-
why-2015-12. 
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CONCLUSION 
This brief review of sandbagging, waiver of jury trial, and non-compete 
provisions in Delaware, New York, and California demonstrates the complex 
impact a governing jurisdiction can have on a M&A deal. Each of these states 
in one way or another approaches the M&A provisions differently, which 
ultimately may materially alter a contract or agreement. 
At this point, one might be considering why anything stated above is even 
relevant given that today many business entities have substantial relationships 
or significant contacts in several different jurisdictions. While such business 
entities have great flexibility and can be strategic in choosing their choice of 
law or the governing law of their contracts or agreements, it is always best to 
be prepared, especially in transactions such as M&A deals that are large in 
scope and prone to failure.90 Without plunging into a detailed discussion 
regarding civil procedure, the study of forum selection itself is complex and 
multifaceted. For example, in Keener v. Convergys Corp., even though the 
parties selected Ohio law to apply to their employment agreement and 
expected Ohio law to apply, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
application of Georgia law, which served to invalidate the employment 
agreement’s non-compete provision.91 The Eleventh Circuit held that Georgia 
law applied over Ohio law, because Georgia had a “materially greater interest” 
in applying its law.92 This greater interest stemmed from the employee being a 
resident of Georgia and non-compete provisions violating long-standing 
Georgia public policy.93 While most cases and contract disputes do not result 
in another jurisdiction governing the contract, choice of law or governing law 
provisions will not always be effective and followed by courts. It would 
behoove an individual or party drafting a contract or agreement to be aware of 
the related jurisdiction’s default rules in the unlikely scenario that the 
jurisdiction invalidates their drafted forum selection clause and applies its 
default rules to the transaction. 
 
 90 Lucinda Shen, These Are the Biggest Deals to Fall Apart in 2016, FORTUNE (May 12, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/05/12/biggest-deals-fall-apart-2016/; Lucinda Shen, M&A Breakups Have Cost Wall 
Street $1.2 Billion in 2016 Alone, FORTUNE (May 5, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/05/merger-breakups-
cost-wall-street/; see Justin Zeth, Revenue lost from withdrawn M&A at highest level since 2007, DEALOGIC 
(May 4, 2016), http://www.dealogic.com/insights/global-withdrawn-ma-revenue-highest-since-2007/.  
 91 342 F.3d 1264, 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 92 Keener, 342 F.3d at 1267 (quoting Keener v. Convergys Corp., 312 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
 93 Id. at 1271. 
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In conclusion, jurisdictional default rules play a crucial role in every M&A 
transaction. This Essay’s analysis serves to ensure more M&A deals reach 
closing and the prevention of future litigation. Once one acknowledges the 
importance of jurisdictional default rules in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions, one will have the upper hand in any M&A deal and the ability to 
forge a truly beneficial agreement. As discussed in Part II, default rules may 
alter a purchase price by millions as well as dictate the course of negotiations 
and drafting. For example, a buyer in California will push to have language 
included in the agreement that expressly states his or her knowledge does not 
alter his or her reliance on the seller’s representations or warranties while, at 
the same time, a buyer in Delaware will not even mention this. Similarly, a 
buyer in California in order to avoid going to trial will negotiate for an 
arbitration agreement while a buyer in Delaware may just draft a waiver of jury 
trial provision. This Essay’s analysis also serves to provide a more thorough 
understanding of jurisdictional default rules to allow for the speculation of 
their viability as well as to predict how certain jurisdictions may act in the 
future. As discussed in Part III, there are several interconnected reasons that 
explain and determine a jurisdiction’s treatment of M&A provisions. The 
state’s dependence on franchise taxes and corporate fees, the state’s market 
size, and the state’s special interest groups all play a role in determining 
whether a jurisdiction adopts pro-buyer or pro-seller stance regarding its 
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